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COMMENT
CREDIT CARD FRAUD: THE
NEGLECTED CRIME
I.

INTRODUCTION

Credit cards are an integral part of the American economy.1
Due to the widespread use of credit cards and checks, we have be3
come a "cashless society." 2 Credit card usage has grown rapidly,
therefore, "[t]he plastic credit card seems destined to replace the
paper check as the primary means of paying for goods and services. ' 4 The extensive use of credit cards, however, has its
drawbacks.
Credit card fraud is foremost among these problems. 5 The to1 For an early observation of the role of credit cards in the American economy, see
Note, The Apportionment of Credit Card FraudLoss, 4 U.C.D. L. REV. 377, 377 (1971).
2 In 1972, an Illinois Commission on credit card fraud observed that we were
"quickly becoming a cashless society." ILL. LEG. INVESTIGATING COMM'N, CREDIT CARD
FRAUD IN ILLINOIS (1972). Two years later, Justice White declared that the country had
entered the "era of the 'cashless' society." United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 416
(1974) (White, J., dissenting). See also Landey, Consumer Cardholder Defenses in Tripartite
Credit CardArrangements: A Battlegroundfor the BeleaguredBank, 88 COM. L.J. 84, 84 (1983).
3 J. FONSECA & P. TEACHOUT, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES § 10.7 (2d ed.
1980) (reporting geometric increase in credit card usage). In 1984, consumer credit
purchases totalled 296 billion dollars, which is approximately a six hundred percent increase over the amount of credit card purchases in 1970. See NEwSwEEK, July 8, 1985, at
52; Note, supra note 1, at 377.
4 J. FONSECA & P. TEACHOUT, supra note 3, at § 10.1; see also The Credit Card Protection
Act: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs on H.R. 2885 and H.R. 3622, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 287
(1983) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (statement of the National Retail Merchants
Association). In the United States, 116 million people own 720 million active credit
cards. See FORBES, Nov. 5, 1984, at 229; L.A. Times, March 18, 1984, § 5, at 3.
5 See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 3, 1983, at 78; see also NATION'S Bus., May 1984,
at 20 (credit card fraud is fastest growing crime against business). The amount of fraud
perpetrated against the two major bank cards (VISA and Mastercard) in 1982 was 125.8
million dollars, which was two and a half times greater than the amount of money stolen
in bank robberies. See Credit CardFraud, Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of
the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing] (statement of John G. Alexander, Chairman of the
American Banking Association); House Hearings, supra note 4, at 265 (statement of Sandra
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tal amount of credit card fraud in 1982, including that which involved bank cards, retail store cards, and gas cards, was
approximately one billion dollars, and annual losses soon could
reach two billion dollars. 6 The cost of this fraud ultimately is borne
7
by the consumer.
Several factors explain the enormous rise in credit card fraud. 8
First, the increased use of credit cards contributes to increased
credit card fraud. Increased card usage, however, accounts for only
a portion of the escalation of credit card fraud because card fraud is
growing considerably faster than overall card usage.9
Second, the ease with which an individual can commit credit
card fraud contributes to the problem.1 0 Potential criminals can obtain credit cards or account numbers and know that a cardholder
cannot easily detect this fraud. A variety of people regularly handle
others' credit cards or account numbers, 1 therefore, a cardholder
has difficulty identifying the thief. Furthermore, the cardholder is
unlikely to discover the fraud in time to prevent it,12 especially if the
criminal steals an account number. Frequently, cardholders do not
know that unauthorized persons have used their credit cards or acJ. McLaughlin, Senior Vice-President of Mellon Bank); S.

REP. No. 368, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1984). See also Senate Hearing,supra note 5, at 13 (statement of Charles P. Nelson,
Assistant Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigation); id. at 18 (statement of Senator D'Amato).
6 See Senate Hearing,supra note 5, at 1 (statement of Senator Hawkins); H.R. REP. No.
426, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983); N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, § 3, at 12.
7 See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 5, at 78 (customers pay for costs of credit
card fraud through higher interest rates and larger annual card fees).
s Card issuers have been unsuccessful in limiting credit card fraud despite developing cards that are difficult to counterfeit and financing "sting" operations aimed at
catching credit card fraud criminals. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 5, at 79
(VISA began financing a "sting" operation); N.Y. Times, supra note 6, at 12 (issuers
developing carbonless forms); N.Y. Times, March 2, 1983, § 4, at 20 (Mastercard added
hard to duplicate hologram to their credit card). While issuers may have some shortterm impact, criminals usually quickly overcome new issuer security measures. See Senate
Hearing, supra note 5, at 14 (statement of Charles P. Nelson, Assistant Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigation); U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 5, at 79.
9 See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 6, at 2; SAT. EVENING PosT, July/Aug. 1984, at
128 (American Banking Association predicted that credit card fraud would double in
1984); N.Y. Times, supra note 6, at 12.
10 See SAT. EVENING POST, supra note 9, at 128 (quoting Kurt Watson, Vice-President
of the Fourth National Bank of Wichita, Kansas); Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 23; Wall
St.J.,Jan. 11, 1983, at 37 (quoting George Fernandez, Fraud & Forgery Supervisor for
Miami Police Department).
I I According to Larry Schwartz of the Fraud & Theft Information Bureau, "each actively used credit card passes through over 1,000 hands each year....
L.A. Times,
supra note 4, at 3.
12 See generally Comment, Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards and Some Related Questions:
What Problems Remain?, 62 Ky. LJ. 881 (1974).
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count numbers until they receive their monthly statements.' 3 Thus,
credit card thieves make two-thirds of their purchases before owners
14
suspect that their cards are being used fraudulently.
Third, not only does credit card fraud usually remain undetected until long after the criminal has completed the crime, but also
law enforcement efforts are lax. 15 Law enforcement agencies have
"paid little attention to this genre of crime." 1 6 Thus, these agencies
are partially responsible for the growth in credit card fraud.
Finally, although these factors all contribute to the problem of
credit card fraud, inadequate state and federal laws are the biggest
reason for the success of credit card fraud.' 7 As this Comment will
demonstrate, prosecutors litigate organized fraud schemes primarily
at the federal level which is where the weaknesses in the laws have
been the most glaring.
While petty crimes constitute the majority of credit card fraud
incidents,' 8 this Comment focuses on the fraud committed in large
organized schemes that account for half of the total dollar amount
of credit card fraud.' 9 Nevertheless, the states have a vital role in
combatting credit card fraud because they are better equipped than
the federal government to prosecute local crimes. 20 There is an
amalgam of state statutes, 2 ' each statute having its own idiosyncra13 See Card Holder Can Reduce Risk of Unauthorized Use, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 23
(citing study by American Bankers Association Task Force).
14 Senate Hearing,supra note 5, at 43 (statement of William Neumann, Vice-President
of Security for VISA International).
15 Id. The agency most responsible for enforcement of federal credit card fraud statutes is the United States Postal Service, which investigated only eighty cases in 1982. Id.
The Secret Service has "done little direct work on credit card counterfeiting." Id. The
FBI has excellent investigative skills, but "has been very restrained in its handling of
credit-card cases...." ACROSS THE BD., Sept. 1983, at 18 (quoting Donal Merkley, Head
of Security for the Wells Fargo Bank).
16 ACROSS THE BD., supra note 15, at 18.
17 See generally Senate Hearing,supra note 5; House Hearings, supra note 4.
18 Seventy-two percent of fraudulent credit card transactions are for less than $150
each. See Senate Hearing, supra note 5, at 66 (Appendix C, supplied by VISA International). Furthermore, "[t]he average credit card loss is $75 per card." L.A. Times, supra

note 4, at 3 (quoting Tony Adamski, chief of FBI's financial crimes unit).
19 See Senate Hearing,supra note 5, at 66 (Appendix C, supplied by VISA International)
(criminals commit half of the dollar amount of credit card fraud in fraudulent transactions worth at least five hundred dollars). Organized crime is involved substantially in
large credit card fraud schemes. See generally S. REP. No. 368, supra note 5, at 2; H.R.
REP. No. 426, supra note 6, at 2; ACROSS THE BD., supra note 15, at 13-14; U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., supra note 5, at 78.
20 See S. REP. No. 368, supra note

5, at 5. Furthermore, the federal government does
not have the resources to prosecute all credit card fraud. L.A. Times, supra note 4, at 3
(quoting Tony Adamski, chief of FBI's financial crimes unit).
21 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-9-14 (1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.285-.290 (1983);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2101 to -2108 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2301 (1977):
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cies. 2 2 Prosecutors try most large credit card fraud cases at the fedCAL. PENAL CODE §§ 484d-484j (West 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5-201 to -204
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-128a to -128i (West 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 903-904 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.481 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-930 to -39 (1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 851-1 to -12 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-3122 to 3127 (Supp. 1984); Illinois Credit Card Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, §§ 5901-5933
(1983): IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-5-4 (Burns 1979); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 715.1-.7 (West
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3729 (1981); Credit and Debit Card Crime Act, Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 434.550-.730 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.67.3
(West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 905 (1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§145 (Supp. 1983); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 37A-37D (West 1981); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 28.354(13)-.354(18) (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52(3)(c)
(West Supp. 1984); Mississippi Credit Card Crime Law of 1968, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 9719-5 to -29 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 570.130 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-6-317 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-512(4) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.610.810 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638.5 (Supp. 1979); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-6
(West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16-25 to -38 (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 165.17 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-113.1 to .17 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2913.21 (Baldwin 1983); Oklahoma Credit Card Crime Act of 1970, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, §§ 1550.1 to .38 (West 1983); ORE. REV. STAT. § 165.055 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4106 (Purdon 1983); Credit Card Crime Act, R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-49-1 to -13
(1981); Financial Transaction Card Crime Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-10 to -100
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 2-30A-8.1 (1979); State Credit
Card Crime Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-501 to -513 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 32.31 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-506 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§§ 4041-4045 (1970); VA. CODE § 18-2-191 to -197 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-24a
(1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.41 (West Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-802 (1977). The
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico also have credit card fraud statutes. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-3823 (Supp. 1984); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 4556 (1976). A provision for
credit card fraud also appears in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.6

(1962). Two states, North Dakota and Washington, do not have a credit card fraud
statute and neither does the Virgin Islands. This Comment will exclude these states
when discussing the number of states without certain provisions.
22 For example, just over half of the states explicitly punish the unauthorized use of a

credit card account number. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2105; ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-2302; CAL. PENAL CODE § 484f; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5-201 to -204; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-128c; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 903, 904; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.481;
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-39; IDAHO CODE § 18-3124; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3729; Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 434.630; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 905; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
266, § 37C; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-317; NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.740; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:21-6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-113.1 to .17; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1550.1-.38;
ORE. REV. STAT. § 165.055; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4106; R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-49-3;
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-14-40; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-501 to -513; TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 32.31; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-506; VA. CODE § 18-2-193; W. VA. CODE § 61-3242; Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-802. The District of Columbia has the same provision. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-3823. For a discussion of the federal treatment of the fraudulent use of
credit card account numbers, see infra notes 40-58, 103 and accompanying text.

All but three states prohibit schemes in which the initial cardholder transfers a
credit card knowing that the transferee will use the card fraudulently. See, e.g., MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-6-317; N.Y. PENAL LAw § 165.17; S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-30A-8.1.
For a description of these schemes in the federal context, see ifra notes 67-69, 105-06
and accompanying text.
In approximately half the states, the mere possession of a stated number of fraudulent credit cards is a crime, and in only a few states is the requisite number of cards
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eral level; consequently, it is beyond the scope of this Comment to
analyze the states' credit card fraud laws.
After examining the shortcomings in the old federal credit card
statute, this Comment will analyze the impact of the Credit Card
Fraud Act of 1984 on credit card fraud. Overall, this Comment argues that the Act, which is a section of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, corrects many of the weaknesses in the old
federal statutes and should prove quite helpful in reducing credit
card fraud. It might, however, also create several serious problems.
II.

THE FEDERAL SCHEME

The federal government uses several different statutes to prosecute credit card fraud. Prosecutors frequently utilize section 1644
of the Truth in Lending Act 2 3 and the mail fraud 24 and wire fraud 25
statutes to prosecute credit card fraud. Of the three statutes, only
section 1644 is specifically designed for credit card fraud. Congress
enacted section 1644 in 1970 in response to the emergence of credit
cards as a major factor in the economy. 2 6 The statute prohibits using an illegal card 2 7 or receiving goods purchased with one. 28 For
greater than two. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-9-14; ALAsKA STAT. § 11.46.290; ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2106; CAL. PENAL CODE § 484i; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-204; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-128f; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.63; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-31; HAwAII
REV. STAT. § 851.6; IDAHO CODE § 18-3125; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, §§ 5901-5933; Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.680; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 266, § 37B (statute prohibits
possession of four or more illegal credit cards); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.354(16);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.730; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-6; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-30 (statute prohibits possession of four or more illegal credit cards); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2913.21; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1550.2; R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-49-3; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-14-20; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-504; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31; VA. CODE
§ 18-2-194. For a discussion of the federal treatment of the possession of an illegal
credit card, see infra notes 70-73, 107-08 and accompanying text.
Only nine states do not prohibit an attempt to commit credit card fraud. See, e.g.,
ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.46.285-290; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2301; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 434.550-.730; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.67.3; MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 28.354(13).354(18); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52(3)(c); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 570.130; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2913.21; S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 22-30A-8.1. The District of Columbia's
Code has the same shortcoming. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3823. The Model Penal
Code also fails to punish attempted credit card fraud. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.6.
23 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1982).
24 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
25 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
26 For a legislative history of the Truth in Lending Act, see Weistart, Consumer Protection in the Credit Card Industiy: Federal Legislative Controls, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1475 (1972).
27 15 U.S.C. § 1644 defines an illegal credit card as "any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen or fraudulently obtained credit card ..
" Id.
28 The most frequently invoked subsection of§ 1644 defines a credit card criminal as
follows:
Whoever knowingly in a transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce, uses
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section 1644 to apply, a person must commit at least one thousand
dollars of credit card fraud in a one year period.2 9 The statute does
not outlaw the use of an unauthorized account number, but rather,
30
prohibits only the use of an illegal card.
Because credit card fraud is not the primary focus of the Truth
in Lending Act, the Act is not as helpful in prosecuting credit card
fraud as it could be. Congress wanted the Truth in Lending Act to
protect consumers; however, the Act does not mention credit card
fraud in the purpose section of the statute.3 1 The reason for this
omission is that the primary purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is
to promote the informed use of credit, not to reduce credit card
fraud.3 2 Nevertheless, one commentator has stated that Congress
passed the law to protect the consumer,3 3 and the judiciary has
34
adopted this interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act.
Federal authorities also have used other statutes to prosecute
credit card fraud. Chief among these is the mail fraud statute. 35
This statute prohibits the use of the mail to perpetrate credit card
fraud. Similarily, the wire fraud statute proscribes the use of wire
communication equipment to accomplish a fraudulent credit card
36
scheme.
or attempts to use any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen, or fraudulently obtained credit card to obtain money, goods, services, or anything else of
value which within any one-year period has a value aggregating $1,000 or more....
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a) (1982). Section 1644(d) of the Truth in
Lending Act prohibits the receipt of goods obtained in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a).
29 Id.
30 The definition of "credit card" provided in the Act includes any "credit device."
15 U.S.C. § 1682(k).
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (outlines general purpose of Act).
32 See generally Weistart, supra note 26.
33 Comment, supra note 12, at 893.
34 See, e.g., Martin v. American Express, 361 So. 2d 597, 600 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978)
(dicta suggests that courts should construe the Act liberally in favor of consumers).
35 The mail fraud statute reads as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away,
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or
intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction
thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom
it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
36 The wire fraud statute parallels the mail fraud statute, except that it applies to
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Prosecutors use the preceding statutes to prosecute credit card
fraud. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 197837 regulates credit
card fraud investigations. The statute specifies the parameters
within which the enforcement agencies may question credit card issuers about fraud. 38 Law enforcement agencies must already be
conducting an inquiry into a specific potential violation before the
39
issuer has to release the relevant records.
III.

PROBLEMS WITH THE OLD FEDERAL LAWS

Before the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, the federal statutory scheme for credit card fraud had several
weaknesses. The major problems included: the prosecution of
criminals who committed credit card fraud by using the credit card
account number, but not the credit card itself; the aggregation requirement; the definition of fraudulent acts; the use of the mail and
wire fraud statutes to prosecute credit card fraud; and, the financial
privacy laws.
A.

ACCOUNT NUMBER

Criminals do not need an actual credit card to commit fraud.
All they need is the account number. For instance, criminals can
print white plastic by using the account number without the actual
credit card. In white plastic schemes, criminals emboss account
numbers on plain pieces of plastic. Next, they imprint invoices with
these cards; then, collusive merchants accept these invoices, thereby
completing the scheme. 40 Counterfeiters also can print cards with
actual credit card numbers that they obtain in a variety of ways, including from carbons of credit card purchase receipts. 4 ' Furthermore, by using an unauthorized credit card number to purchase
products by mail order, criminals can accomplish credit card fraud
42
without using the actual card.
wires used in communication rather than the mail used in communication. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (1982).
37 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1982).
38 12 U.S.C. § 3405. The Right to Financial Privacy Act regulates banks and applies
to credit card issuers because the issuers of the major credit cards are banks.
39 See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 5, at 4 (statement of James Knapp, Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department ofJustice).
40 See Wall St. J., supra note 13, at 23 (authorities in Miami break up multi-million
dollar white plastic ring).
41 See generally Senate Hearing,supra note 5; House Hearings,supra note 4; H.R. REP. No.
894, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. REP. No. 368, supra note 5; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra
note 6; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 5.
42 See United States v. Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837
(1983); King v. United States, 512 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Courts have split over whether section 1644 penalizes the unauthorized use of an account number, or whether the law penalizes
only the illegal use of a credit card. The two appeals courts that
43
have heard cases on this point disagree on the issue.
The first of these cases was United States v. Callihan.4 4 In Callihan, the appellant communicated the illegally obtained numbers by
telephone across state lines. 4 5 The district court found Callihan
guilty of three counts of wire fraud and five counts of credit card
fraud. 4 6 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously
affirmed the wire fraud convictions, but reversed the credit card
fraud convictions. 4 7 The majority held that Congress clearly intended to exclude the use of account numbers from the ambit of
section 1644.48 The court noted that otherwise Congress would
have specifically prohibited the illegal use of mere account numbers,
49
as it did in the mail and wire fraud statutes.
One year after Callihan, the Fourth Circuit held that section
1644 does prohibit the unauthorized use of account numbers. 50 In
United States v. Bice-Bey, 5 1 the appellant ordered merchandise from
an out-of-state firm by using an unauthorized card number. 5 2 The
53
court found her liable under section 1644 for credit card fraud.
The unanimous court acknowledged that there was some merit in
the appellant's contention that section 1644 proscribed only fraudulent credit card usage and not the unauthorized use of an account
number. 5 4 The court, however, dismissed the arguments as unconvincing and held that the judiciary must construe section 1644 as
prohibiting the fraudulent use of a mere account number so as "not
to defeat the congressional purpose. ....55 The Fourth Circuit
stated that because the account number is the core element of a
43 See Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d at 1086 (illegal use of account number violates § 1644);
United States v. Callihan, 666 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1982) (use of account number without
card does not violate § 1644).
44 666 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1982).

45

Id. at 423.

Id.
Id.
The court concluded that "the term 'credit card' as used in section 1644 means the
small, flat tablet upon which a credit card account number is imprinted, but does not
mean that number alone." Id. at 424.
49 Id.
50 Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837 (1983).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1088-89.
53 Id. at 1092.
54 Id.
55 Id. (court rejected defendant's argument as overly literalistic reading of the
statute).
46
47
48
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credit card, fraudulent use of the account number itself violates section 1644.56

The Ninth Circuit's definition of a credit card for the purposes
of section 1644 is clearly the correct one because the Truth in Lending Act defines a credit card as a device. 5 7 Thus, the statute does
not prohibit the fraudulent use of an account number because an
account number is an intangible, not a device. Yet, criminals can
commit a substantial amount of credit card fraud without possessing
the card. 58 Therefore, the narrow definition of a credit card is a
large loophole in section 1644.
B.

AGGREGATION

Section 1644 prohibits only "transaction [s] ... within any one-

year period that ha[ve] a value aggregating $1,000 or more ....-59
On its face, the statute appears to mandate charges on one card of at
least one thousand dollars. Federal authorities, therefore, have not
attempted to prosecute several criminals who amass less than one
thousand dollars of charges on one credit card. 60 Consequently,
criminals have used numerous fraudulent cards to compile total
charges well in excess of one thousand dollars, but have been careful not to incur charges on any individual card greater than one
61
thousand dollars.
The Fifth Circuit is currently the sole proponent of the minority
position that the jurisdictional amount in section 1644 can be met
by aggregating purchases made using several fraudulent cards. 6 2 In
United States v. Mikelberg,63 a unanimous court held that Congress ob56 Id. Accord State v. Howard, 221 Kan. 51, 557 P.2d 1280 (1976) (using account
number fraudulently is equivalent to using credit card itself fraudulently). After the
Howard decision, the Kansas legislature changed the statute to include a mere account
number in the definition of a financial card. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3729(2)(a) (1981).
See also Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d at 1092 (dicta urging the Supreme Court to resolve dispute
over whether fraudulent use of just account number constitutes credit card fraud).
57 See supra note 30.
58 For examples of how criminals commit fraud by using just an account number, see
supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
59 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a).
60 See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 4, at 178 (statement ofJohn C. Keeney, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department ofJustice). The
federal government usually will not prosecute credit card fraud unless the amount in
question is at least $10,000; in the more overloaded federal district courts, the amount
tends to be at least $50,000. See NATION'S Bus., supra note 5, at 24.
61 H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 41, at 5.
62 See United States v. Mikelberg, 517 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
909 (1976).
63 517 F.2d 246.
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viously intended such aggregation. 6 4 According to the court, to
hold otherwise would eviscerate the power of section 1644.65 While
the Fifth Circuit's liberal construction of the aggregation requirement is dubious, the court was accurate in contending that any other
construction of section 1644 would destroy its effectiveness. The
interpretation of the majority of courts of the aggregation requirement, however, renders the statute too narrow to effectively combat
credit card fraud.
C.

REQUISITE FRAUDULENT ACT

In order to be within the purview of section 1644, a person
must "knowingly ...use any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged,
lost, stolen orfraudulently obtained credit card ..."66 This portion of
the statute contains two loopholes. First, the expression "fraudulently obtained" is underinclusive: it excludes some behavior that is
unauthorized by the issuing credit card company. Parties enter
transactions whereby cardholders sell their cards to other individuals. 6 7 The cardholders then report their cards as lost or stolen,
while the card purchasers amass large bills. 68 These card buyers are
not subject to the provisions of the statute because they obtained
69
the credit cards without using fraud.
Second, section 1644 does not prohibit the mere possession of
fraudulent credit cards or counterfeiting equipment. 70 Therefore,
law enforcement officials must apprehend these criminals actually
purchasing merchandise with the fraudulent credit cards. As a result, prosecutors have a very difficult time proving that a person has
7
violated the statute. '
The need for a statute forbidding the possession of fraudulent
64 Id. at 251-52. The court was interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1644 as it read before the
1974 amendment that reduced the jurisdictional amount from $5,000 to $1,000. The
court took on judicial notice that fraudulent purchases on an individual card rarely exceed five thousand dollars. Id.
65 Id. at 252.
66 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a) (emphasis added).
67 See Senate Hearing,supra note 5, at 5 (statement ofJames Knapp, Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division of the Department ofJustice).
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., United States v. Kasper, 483 F. Supp. 1208 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (defendants
received credit cards from cardholders and were found not guilty of violating § 1644
because although defendants' intents were fraudulent, they did not obtain cards
fraudulently).
70 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a).
71 Experts believe that possession of illegal credit cards should be a federal crime.
See House Hearings,supra note 4, at 178 (statement ofJohn C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice); 130 CONG.
REC. H7631 (daily ed. July 24, 1984) (statement of Representative Sawyer). See generally
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credit cards is apparent in cases where the cardholder lied in order
to obtain the card. If there is not a statute prohibiting the mere
possession of illegal credit cards, the prosecutor must demonstrate
that the issuer relied on a false statement of the cardholder. 7 2 Also,
without this type of statute, law enforcement officials have the potentially nettlesome problem of proving that a criminal fraudulently
obtained a credit card. 73 This loophole in section 1644 forces the
government to establish much more than mere possession of illegal
credit cards, even though unauthorized possession is a sufficiently
serious crime to warrant prosecution.
D.

MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD STATUTES

The mail and wire fraud statutes sometimes are applicable in
credit card fraud cases. 74 These statutes are difficult for prosecutors
to utilize, however, because the statutes require prosecutors to
demonstrate a nexus between the use of the mail or wires and the
75
execution of the fraud.
In United States v. Maze, 76 the defendant stole his roommate's
credit card and used the card in several states. 7 7 Innocent
merchants then mailed the sales slips from Maze's purchases across
state lines to the issuing bank. 78 Maze did not violate section 1644
because the amount of his fraudulent credit card purchases was less
than the statutory amount, 79 and therefore, the federal authorities
were forced to prosecute Maze under the mail fraud statute.8 0
The United States Supreme Court81 affirmed the judgment of
H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 41; S. REP. No. 368, supra note 5; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra
note 6.
72 Cf United States v. Chapman, 591 F.2d 1287, 1288 (9th Cir. 1979) (credit card
issuer must show tendency to rely on false information supplied by the criminal).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 545 F.2d 491,493 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833
(1977) (court, in split decision, decided thatjury could have found that card was fraudulently obtained where defendant applied for credit card knowing that he would not pay
bill).
74 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
75 See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974) (Court held that nexus requirement
of mail fraud statute was not satisfied).
76 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
77 Id.

at 396.

78 Id.
79 The statutory amount at that time was five thousand dollars, while the value of
Maze's purchases was no more than two thousand dollars. See id. at 402 n.6.
80 Id. at 397 n.1.
81 The Court took this case in order to resolve a dispute between the circuits. Id. at
398 n.2. Five courts of appeals viewed the mailing of receipts as satisfying the statutory
requirement of using the mails. See United States v. Kelly, 467 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933 (1973); United States v. Madison, 458 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972); United States v. Ciotti, 469 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1972); United
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the Sixth Circuit8 2 holding that the mailings of sales slips were insufficient for the mail fraud statute to govern the fraud.8 3 The majority
reasoned that Maze's scheme was complete when he received the
goods and services. 8 4 According to this line of reasoning, it was irrelevant to Maze's scheme that merchants had mailed the sales slips
85
across state lines.
Chief Justice Burger dissented in order to emphasize that the
majority's decision did not totally preclude the government from using the mail fraud statute to prosecute credit card fraud. 86 He concluded that the decision should be limited to its facts. 8 7 Justice
White also dissented, stressing that it was the mailings that created
the delay that enabled Maze to execute his scheme.8 8 He also objected to the majority's narrow interpretation of section 1341.89
Prosecutions of credit card fraud under the mail fraud statute
have decreased since Maze, but not to the degree predicted by the
dissenters. 90 In cases in which people execute the fraud by submitting false credit card applications, the courts have held that the mail
fraud statute applies. 9 ' Also, where merchants colloborate in the
fraudulent scheme, the use of the mail is necessary to execute the
scheme. Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the mail fraud statStates v. Chason, 451 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972); United
States v. Kellerman, 431 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); United
States v. Thomas, 429 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Kelem, 416 F.2d 346
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 952 (1970); Kloian v. United States, 349 F.2d 291
(5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 913 (1966); Adams v. United States, 312 F.2d 137
(5th Cir. 1963). Two courts of appeals took the opposite view: the Sixth Circuit in Maze,
468 F.2d 529 (1972), and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Lynn, 461 F.2d 759
(1972).
82 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit in a 5-4 decision.
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority which also included Justices Douglas, Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell. Joining Chief Justice Burger's dissent was Justice White. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined Justice White's dissent.
83 Maze, 414 U.S. at 405.
84 The Court noted that "there is no indication that the success of [Maze's] scheme
depended in any way on which of his victims ultimately bore the loss." Id.
85 Id.

Id. at 407 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (ChiefJustice Burger stressed that triviality of alleged
offenses was major reason for Court's decision).
88 Id. at 414 (White, J., dissenting). The majority responded that the causes of the
delay were the distance between the merchants and the bank, and most importantly, the
credit card company's billing system. Id. at 403.
89 Id. at 414-15 (White, J., dissenting).
90 See id. at 416 (White, J., dissenting). See also Senate Hearing,supra note 5, at 6 (statement of Charles P. Nelson, Assistant Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigation).
91 See King v. United States, 512 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Stein, 500
F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1974).
86
87
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ute applies to such an arrangement. 2
The use of the wire fraud statute is a more recent development
94
in the prosecution of credit card fraud.9 3 In United States v. Muni,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a merchant
participating in a fraudulent scheme over the telephone violated the
wire fraud statute.9 5 The court concluded that telephoning for authorization of the credit card purchase was a necessary part of the
fraud; therefore, the merchant violated the wire fraud statute because he used the wires to perpetrate the credit card fraud. 96 In the
later case of United States v. DeBiasi,97 the Second Circuit extended
this rationale one step further. In that case, the court held that a
purchaser of merchandise in large fraudulent credit card transactions knows that the merchant must obtain telephone authorization,
and thus violates the wire fraud statute. 98 The result of this theory
is that the wire fraud statute applies in most credit card fraud cases.
E.

FINANCIAL PRIVACY

In order to enforce the federal credit card laws, the government
must be able to undertake thorough investigations of credit card
charges. The financial privacy statute, however, limits investigators'
access to cardholders' records9 9 to situations in which the investigators already have begun an inquiry into a specific incident. 100
In order to determine whether to begin an investigation of possible fraudulent credit card activity,' 0 ' federal officials argue that investigators should have access to issuer records prior to the
initiation of official investigations. Investigators could do a better
See United States v. Adamo, 534 F.2d 31 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841 (1976).
The first reported case was United States v. Jones, 554 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 866 (1977) (defendant convicted of violating wire fraud statute by using
unauthorized telephone credit card).
94 668 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1981).
95 Id. (merchant used telephone to call across state lines to get approval for fraudulent transaction).
96 Id. at 89-90.
97 712 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983).
98 The court concluded that the defendant had violated the wire fraud statute because "it is common knowledge that authorization is required for large purchases." Id.
at 792.
99 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
100 See 12 U.S.C. § 3405(1). See also Senate Hearing, supra note 5, at 5 (statement of
James Knapp, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice).
101 A federal official has proposed allowing investigators to examine bank records
before they initiate an official inquiry. See House Hearings,supra note 4, at 178 (statement
ofJohn C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the
Department ofJustice).
92
93
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job of uncovering patterns of fraudulent behavior by having greater
access to credit card records. This reform would not lead to undue
intrusion upon a cardholder's privacy because the bank already has
access to these records, and investigators would not reveal the discovered information.
IV.

THE CREDIT CARD FRAUD ACT OF

1984

In 1984, Congress enacted the Credit Card Fraud Act, Chapter
XVI of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,102 in an at-

tempt to correct the deficiencies in section 1644 of the Truth in
Lending Act. Although the Comprehensive Crime Control Act improves the definition of a fraudulent act and strengthens the penalty
provisions, it also creates several problems.
A.

REQUISITE FRAUDULENT ACT

The Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984 substantially improves the
definition of criminal credit card activity. Perhaps most importantly,
one provision provides that the use of an account number, without
the card itself, can constitute credit card fraud. 10 3 Thus, section
1029 of the Act eliminates the "account number" loophole of the
old statutory scheme. 10 4 Second, section 1029 states that an "unauthorized access device" includes one that is "obtained with intent to
defraud.
."o5 This provision eliminates the "fraudulently obtained" loophole of the old statutory scheme. 10 6
Third, the Act forbids the possession of fifteen or more illegal
credit cards.' 0 7 The fifteen card limit is, however, too high. A person in possession of ten illegal credit cards certainly is involved in
major credit card fraud. With even a five card minimum, minor
cases still would be kept out of the federal courts.' 0 8 Although the
102 Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1984).
103 The statute prohibits the use of an unauthorized or fraudulent "access device," 18
U.S.C. § 1029(a), and states that
the term 'access device' means any card, plate, code, account number, or other means
of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access

device, to obtain money, goods, services, or other thing of value, or that can be used
to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper
instrument)....
18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1)(emphasis added).
104 See supra notes 40-58 and accompanying text.
105 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(3).
106

For a discussion of the "fraudulently obtained" loophole, see supra notes 67-69

and accompanying text.
107 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3).

108 Committees in both the Senate and the House have proposed a five card cutoff.
See S. REP. No. 368, supra note 5, at 7; H.R. REP. No. 894, supra note 41.
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fifteen card limit is excessive, it is an improvement on section 1644
which does not penalize the possession of illegal credit cards. This
new provision helps ease the government's burden of proof in credit
card fraud cases because the government will not have to apprehend
an individual in the act of committing credit card fraud. 10 9 Thus,
the new Act should enable prosecutors to eschew using the unwieldy mail and wire fraud statutes.
Fourth, the new statute attempts to clarify the aggregation requirement."1 0 In cases involving devices that are unauthorized but
not counterfeit, the courts will aggregate the value of the criminal's
credit fraud, regardless of the number of cards involved."' This
provision will help eliminate the problems of the aggregation requirement in section 1644.112
Fifth, the new statute punishes both those persons who produce
counterfeit credit cards" 13 and those persons who possess device
making equipment."t 4 Furthermore, the omission of a minimum
statutory amount requirement in cases involving counterfeit credit
cards'15 indicates Congress' intent to simplify the proof of counterfeiting. Because most counterfeiters are involved in large fraudulent schemes, the omission of a minimum statutory amount
requirement fortunately will not cause a significant increase in the
number of federal prosecutions of counterfeiting. The omission
simply will reduce the prosecutor's burden of proof in counterfeiting cases.
The Credit Card Fraud Act apparently is not a replacement for
section 1644; rather, it supplements the already existing credit card
fraud statute."16 Presumably, once federal prosecutors have become accustomed to the new statute, they will employ primarily the
new statute because it simplifies their burden of proof and increases
117
the potential penalty for those convicted of credit card fraud.
109 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
110 The statute punishes any person who "knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized devices during any one-year period, and by
such conduct obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during that period ..
" 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2).
11 Id. The statute thus follows the approach of United States v. Mikelberg, 517 F.2d
246 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 909 (1976). See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
113 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(1).
114 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(4).
115 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(1).
116 Congress did not mention the coexistence issue in the Credit Card Fraud Act. See
18 U.S.C. § 1029.
117 Prosecutors, however, probably will continue to use § 1644 to prosecute collusive
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Despite all these improvements, the new Act may have created
some problems. First, the definition of credit card now apparently
includes automated banking cards' 1 8 and electronic fund transfers. 119 Congress, in its hurried attempt at the end of the session to
pass the Comprehensive Crime Control Act,' 20 may have attempted
to do too much. Congress apparently did not consider carefully the
significance of the differences between transactions involving electronic fund transfers 12 1 and automated banking cards, as compared
to credit card transactions. 1 22 For example, the transactions differ
in both the technology and the schemes used to commit fraud.
Thus, the problems of electronic fund transfers and automated
banking cards warrant separate treatment, yet the Act deals with
them as if they were credit cards.
Second, in exceptional cases the statute is unjust. For example,
a person who steals an account number and uses it to buy seven
hundred dollars of merchandise has not violated section 1029, but a
person who commits the same crime with a fraudulent account
number is guilty of a federal crime.' 23 These individuals are similarly situated, yet only the person who used the imaginary account
number has violated section 1029. If a person uses a fraudulent account number to buy twenty dollars of merchandise, that person
also has violated section 1029. This unequal treatment of similarly
situated persons may constitute a violation of the equal protection
24
clause. 1
merchants and persons who received goods that were purchased with illegal credit cards
because prosecutors can use § 1029 only if they can demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy. See 15 U.S.C. § 1644(d-f); 18 U.S.C. § 1029. Due to the many elements of the
crime of conspiracy, it is difficult for prosecutors to prove.
118 Automated banking cards are used to deposit or withdraw money from a bank
electronically. See, e.g., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., supra note 5, at 79.

119 See 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) (defines "credit card").
120 The House did not discuss the Credit Card Fraud Act (which was just an amendment to the continuing appropriations bill), while the Senate passed a similar bill earlier
that year. S. 1870, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S4824 (daily ed. April 25,
1984). Thus, Congress never examined the impact of this legislation on electronic fund
transfers or automated bank cards.
121 The issue of electronic fund transfers is so complicated and controversial that
there is a federal statute devoted solely to that subject. See Electronic Fund Transfer
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1982).
122 Automated bank card frauds usually involve relatively minor amounts. See U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., supra note 5, at 79. Therefore, a federal statute is probably an
inappropriate method by which to approach the problem because minor frauds are best
prosecuted by the states. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
123 The penalties for the two types of crimes are very different, and hence, also could
cause an injustice. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
124 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & I. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 818-19 ("unfair
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PENALTIES

The penalties under the Credit Card Fraud Act 12 5 and the
Truth in Lending Act 12 6 for the unauthorized use or possession of
credit cards are essentially the same. Both acts set a maximum of
ten years in prison and a ten thousand dollar fine.' 27 The new statute, however, also provides for a greater monetary penalty in egregious cases.' 28 This provision has the same beneficial deterrent
129
effect as a restitution provision.
Under the Credit Card Fraud Act, counterfeiting or possession
of device-making equipment also carries a greater penalty than
other types of credit card fraud. 13 0 The statute provides for "a fine
of not more than the greater of $50,000 or twice the value obtained
by the offense or imprisonment for not more than fifteen years, or
both.... ."131 This stringent penalty should deter any criminal, even
a member of organized crime. 132 Although the penalty should be an
effective deterrent for counterfeiting, in rare cases it might cause
inequitable treatment, 3 3 and thereby possibly violate the equal protection clause. 134
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has examined the present state of credit card
fraud. The enormous impact of credit cards in our society cannot
be overemphasized. Unfortunately, credit card fraud is increasing
even faster than overall credit card use. The losses resulting from
credit card fraud are staggering, and the unfortunate result is that
customers bear those losses.
treatment" of individual by criminal justice system is violation of equal protection

clause).
125 See 18 U.S.C. § 1029(c)(1).
126 See 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1982).
127 15 U.S.C. § 1644(f).
128 The Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984 prescribes "a fine of not more than the greater

of $10,000 or twice the value obtained by the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1029(c)(1)
(emphasis added).
129 See Senate Hearing,supra note 5, at 12 (statement ofJames Knapp, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department ofJustice).
130 18 U.S.C. § 1029.
131 Id.
132 When a person's conviction for counterfeiting is not that person's first violation of
§ 1029, the statute increases the penalty to "a fine of not more than the greater of
$100,000 or twice the value obtained by the offense or imprisonment for not more than
twenty years, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 1029(c)(3).
133 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
134 SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & I. YOUNG, supra note 124, at 821 (equal protection
clause provides an individual the right to "fair treatment" in sentencing).
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The key to reducing large credit card fraud schemes is a wellwritten federal statute. Although the states have a vital role in small
cases, they are not capable of prosecuting large interstate schemes
effectively. Card issuers have taken measures to limit credit card
fraud and these measures can have some short-term impact.
Criminals, however, are able to overcome issuers' new obstacles in a
short period of time. Cardholders also are unable to prevent misuse
because they often are unaware of the fraud until they receive their
monthly credit card statements.
The old federal statutory scheme has several shortcomings. It
is unclear whether section 1644 prohibits the unauthorized use of
an account number. The aggregation requirement also is uncertain.
Furthermore, the statute does not prohibit the possession of "bad"
credit cards; therefore, prosecutors frequently had to use the unwieldy mail and wire fraud statutes.
The Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984 corrects most of the
problems of previous federal statutory schemes. The new statute
punishes fraudulent use of an account number, eliminates the
"fraudulently obtained" loophole of the old statute, punishes mere
possession of illegal credit cards, clarifies the aggregation requirement, and punishes the counterfeiting of credit cards and possession of counterfeiting equipment. The new statute, however, has
two major flaws: first, it defines "credit card" too broadly; and second, it treats certain similarly situated individuals unequally.
In addition to redefining "credit card" so to exclude automated
bank cards and electronic fund transfers from the ambit of the new
statute, and eliminating the potentially unequal operation of the
statute upon similarily situated individuals, Congress needs to
amend the Financial Privacy Act to allow authorities greater access
to issuer records. Furthermore, the federal government should
devote greater resources to the investigation of credit card fraud.
These changes are necessary to combat the formidable problem of
credit card fraud.
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